In the comments section of my article on the Jew-defending, anti-Hitler shill Anthony Migchels, a commenter going by the name of RR posted a crucial response to one of the claims Migchels made in his attack piece, which was basically that the fact that Hitler did not win the war means that he was secretly working for the Jews.
I have reposted this response below, so as to make sure it is seen by as many people as possible. The “if Hitler was the real deal, he would have won the war” line is, as I have explained, a key part of this last ditch effort being made by Jews such as Henry Makow and his lackeys to keep antisemites from embracing Hitlerian Fascism, so it is very important that we are clear on just how ridiculous this claim is.
Note: I have reformatted the comment to make it more presentable.
Sutton made use of the Sidney Warburg myth to portray Hitler as being funded by Wall Street. Michael Collins Piper has dealt with this in his book “Those Who Reign Supreme”:
Who financed the NSDAP and Hitler has also been covered by Veronica Clark and Henry Ashby Turner:
The generals who wanted to get rid of Hitler were basically responsible for the deaths of many thousands of German soldiers. By acting the way that they did, they effectively harmed the German war effort. Their conspiracy began long before 1944. This has been dealt with here:
Basically, Churchill was the reason that Germany wasn’t able to enter into an alliance with Britain. It was definitely possible to do so and there were many people in parliament who wanted friendship with Germany. Churchill was paid by the Jewish pressure group “The Focus” to get Britain into war with Germany. You can read about this here (ignore the letter by Brüning, a known Hitler hater and “anti-Nazi”, as untrustworthy as Strasser):
Operation Barbarossa was ruined in part because of the Italian invasion of Greece etc, which stalled the German invasion of the Soviet Union and forced Germany to first come to Italy’s rescue.
On page 153 in his memoirs, Keitel writes:
Even if it was too much to ask of our good fortune that Italy should have stayed out of the war altogether as a benevolent neutral, just consider the difference if Hitler had been able to prevent their irresponsible attack on Greece. What would we not have saved by way of aid to Italy for her senseless Balkan war? In all probability there would not have been any uprising in Yugoslavia in an attempt to force her entry into the war on the side of the enemies of the Axis, just to oblige Britain and the Soviet Union. How differently things would then have looked in Russia in 1941. We would have been in a far stronger position, and above all we should not have lost those two months. Just imagine: we would not have frozen to a standstill in the snow and ice, with temperatures of minus forty-five degrees just twenty miles outside Moscow, a city hopelessly encircled from the north, west and south, at the end of that November. We should have had two clear months before that infernal cold weather closed in and there was nothing like it in the winters that followed anyway!
Hitler himself said this about Moscow and the Ukraine:
Still more important was the thrust of Army Group South. The spreading out of the tank and rapid-unit forces into the distant space had to be executed twice. We had to obtain the harvest of the fertile Ukraine, the wheat and the oil from the giant sunflower fields, for our troops and the nation.
The second North-South thrust from Army Group South was aimed toward the raw materials—the coal, iron ore, chromium and manganese, and the important power plants at the Dnieper and Donez region all the way to Rostow and the Black Sea. There, right at the raw material sources, were also located the industrial centers, a concentration of the Russian armament industry and its economic power.
And he said:
Way back, a military personality once gave me the advice that, from an army general upwards obedience decreases and any order is subject to a personal critique. I often had the same experience.
Again and again I noticed that my generals, in their deliberations, completely disregarded the political, geo-political and economic matters. Mostly, they kept to a purely military viewpoint, and that turned out to be traumatic when directed towards Moscow in the Russian campaign.
As I found out later, my generals insinuated that I reflected a Napoleon-related Moscow shyness. Yet, by no means did I misjudge the military and political importance of taking Moscow; but first, the prerequisite for that were successful attacks toward the North and South, those two strategic pillars. Then, Moscow might be the last stage of the gigantic Russian undertaking.
The time favorable for mobile warfare ran out—the valuable time—it was always too little time and too much space in this war.
At the end of September, when I was healthy again, I could still push through one of the flank-and-encirclement thrusts toward the South. That operation I had to literally wrestle from my generals—yes, I had to enforce it by harsh orders. The result: four Russian armies were destroyed, and 650,000 prisoners taken. Even that success did not convince my generals of the only possible strategy within the vast Russian distances.
Against my inner conviction, they set up the frontal offensive against Moscow. Moscow was never in my mind, but they would or could not understand that.
To carry the great strategy through, it was, however, too late. The offensive toward Moscow met an increasingly stiffened Russian defense. Our divisions, tired and weakened by the month-long hard battles, had the target before their eyes and clashed against fresh Siberian forces continually moving in from the far regions.
The frontal offensive toward Moscow lost its momentum against the massive Russian defense. Soon afterward, the front froze in snow and icy cold; the winter equipment, ordered in time, never reached the troops.
Now my generals were for retreat, which meant a Napoleon-like end. The catastrophe.
You may criticize these aims and this strategy in hindsight, but to me it sounds legitimate.
That Hitler wouldn’t build the bomb stems from a false quote, as far as I know, in which he supposedly said that such a weapon would be too horrible and brutal. In reality, the Germans were simply not capable of developing the bomb at the time.
Was Hitler a dictator? He probably was, but maybe he wasn’t. I don’t really care. Read here for more:
I am not sure about Gibraltar. I would imagine that Hitler didn’t want to offend the Spanish by taking it, in part because the Germans hoped that Spain would enter into the war on their side, as repayment for helping to crush Jewish communism and Freemasonry (!) in the Spanish Civil War. Moreover, it is well known that the German Navy simply wasn’t able to compete with the British et al. after 1941.
I haven’t seen any credible sources which prove that Bormann was a spy. So, there is no proof for this; it is really just a theory based on belief.
As for Dunkirk:
German land forces might have pressed their attack on the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and the Allies, especially having secured the ports of Calais and Boulogne. For years, it was assumed that Adolf Hitler ordered the German Army to stop the attack, favouring bombardment by the Luftwaffe. However, according to the Official War Diary of Army Group A, Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt – the Chief of the General Staff, disconcerted by the vulnerability of his flanks and supply to his forward troops, ordered the halt. Hitler merely validated the order several hours after the fact.
Hitler validated the order because he still hoped to achieve peace with Britain. He even had Hess fly to Britain for peace in 1941. The Germans knew though, that it would be difficult to achieve peace with Britain, as long as Churchill was in power.
Dunkirk was of course a mistake, but Hitler was only human after all. He definitely made some mistakes, and this was one of them. It would have been very strange if he made no mistakes, so I don’t think it’s logical to say that he must have been a puppet because he made mistakes.
If all of this is not enough to change your views, then you probably have some special interest in maintaining these myths about Hitler and National Socialism. That may sound like the typical “black-and-white Nazi thinking”. But really, I think this is a solid argument.